Infostealer Steals OpenClaw AI Agent Configuration Files and Gateway Tokens

What Happened

Cybersecurity researchers have documented the first known case of information-stealing malware targeting the popular OpenClaw AI agent framework. The malware, a variant of a common infostealer, successfully exfiltrated sensitive configuration files from an infected system. These files contained critical secrets, including API keys and authentication tokens for the OpenClaw assistant and its connected gateways. This incident marks a significant evolution in infostealer tactics, directly targeting the burgeoning ecosystem of agentic AI tools.

Why It Matters

The compromise of OpenClaw configuration environments poses a direct threat to organizational AI operations and data integrity. OpenClaw, which has seen massive adoption under its current and former names (Clawdbot, Moltbot), is often integrated with business-critical services and data sources via its gateway connections. Stolen API keys and tokens can provide attackers with unauthorized access to these connected services, potentially leading to data breaches, financial fraud, or the hijacking of AI-powered workflows. This event signals that threat actors are rapidly adapting to target new, high-value software ecosystems.

Technical Details

The attack leverages generic information-stealer malware, which has been modified to scan for and exfiltrate specific OpenClaw-related files. The primary target is the framework’s configuration environment, typically stored in local directories (e.g., ~/.openclaw or %APPDATA%\OpenClaw). These files contain plaintext or easily decrypted secrets, including gateway authentication tokens and API keys for integrated services like cloud platforms, databases, and third-party APIs. The infection vector is consistent with standard infostealer distribution, likely through phishing, malicious downloads, or compromised software.

Immediate Risk

The immediate risk is MEDIUM. While not a software vulnerability in OpenClaw itself, the threat is operational and widespread. Any system infected with a compatible infostealer that has added OpenClaw to its target list is now at risk of having these secrets stolen. The consequence severity is high, as stolen credentials can lead to significant lateral movement and data exposure, but the requirement for a pre-existing malware infection moderates the overall urgency. Organizations using OpenClaw agents must treat this as a credible threat to their AI infrastructure.

Security Insight

This incident underscores the critical need to manage secrets for AI agents with the same rigor as traditional IT infrastructure. Security teams should immediately audit OpenClaw deployments to ensure configuration files are not storing secrets in plaintext. Implementing a secrets management solution is paramount. Furthermore, monitoring and endpoint detection rules should be updated to flag unauthorized access or exfiltration attempts targeting OpenClaw configuration directories, treating them with the same sensitivity as SSH keys or password vaults.